In October and November 2026, attackers switched supermarket fridges and freezers across Europe into defrost mode and raised their temperatures to around 50 °C. Stores threw away tons of food. In France, the cold storage of three blood banks was targeted as well. The European Commission's spokesperson said the incidents were not isolated.

These attacks used no new malware and, as far as investigators have said, no unknown vulnerability. The attackers logged in to refrigeration controllers that were reachable from the internet, often with default passwords, on hardware that no longer receives updates. That is why the story matters far outside retail: the same kind of device sits in warehouses, hospitals, factories and data centres.

What happened: two waves

  • 11 to 12 October, France. Refrigeration controllers in roughly 700 supermarkets were set to defrost overnight. Reported figures include more than 300 Intermarché and Netto stores and about 80 each at Coopérative U and Carrefour. Stores in Belgium and the Netherlands were also affected in this period.
  • 20 to 30 October, reconnaissance. The security firm Lupovis recorded 276 probing attempts from 91 sources against Danfoss controller components, peaking on 26 October. Only its sensors in Europe saw the activity.
  • 2 November, second wave. Supermarkets in nine EU countries reported failures: Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Examples from the reporting: 15 of more than 700 Carrefour stores in Belgium, 13 of 223 Musgrave stores in Ireland, about 20 supermarkets in Italy.
  • 3 November. Germany reported four affected supermarkets and Romania six. In the UK, small meat-processing firms were targeted with minimal impact.
  • 2 to 3 November, French blood banks. Temperature and defrost thresholds were manipulated at three sites of the French Blood Establishment (EFS). Independent monitoring raised the alarm quickly, the products were moved and none were lost.
  • 4 November. ENISA, the European Commission, Europol's EC3, the EU CSIRTs Network and EU-CyCLONe issued a joint statement urging organisations to reduce the exposure of affected systems immediately.

How the attackers got in

The French alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 names the device families: Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC controllers and Copeland and Dixell XWEB units. Danfoss said most affected units in France were older models that no longer receive updates, the AK-SM 800 and the AK-SC 355.

  • Direct internet exposure. The controllers were online so that refrigeration contractors could monitor and repair them remotely. The research firm Flare counted at least 2,667 public IP addresses with exposed refrigeration management interfaces.
  • Default and weak passwords. Danfoss confirmed for the Dutch cases that systems were not on a secured network and still used default passwords.
  • Outdated or end-of-life software. Known vulnerabilities exist for these product lines, for example CVE-2025-41450 to CVE-2025-41452 for the AK-SM 800A. Investigators have not shown that exploiting them was necessary.
  • No malware. The attackers used the controllers' own functions: defrost cycles, temperature setpoints, alarm thresholds. To the device, the commands looked like maintenance.

One number from the Flare sample deserves attention: of 547 confirmed addresses, 356 also exposed other services such as remote desktop, cameras or VPN endpoints. An exposed fridge controller is usually a sign of a network that exposes more.

Who is behind the attacks?

Attribution is disputed, and it differs between the two waves.

  • France attributed the October wave on 9 November to a cyber unit linked to Iran's Revolutionary Guard, according to reports on the French government's assessment. The supporting forensic evidence has not been published.
  • Belgium's interior minister said on 13 November that Iran was very likely responsible, while the foreign minister cautioned that the evidence was insufficient for an official attribution.
  • Romania's national cybersecurity director called the attack semi-amateurish and saw no sign of a state actor.
  • Two Russia-aligned hacktivist groups claimed responsibility on 4 November. Researchers treat the claim as unverified.
  • The European Commission leaves attribution to the national authorities. The November wave has no official attribution so far.

For defenders, the answer changes little. When the entry requirements are an internet connection and a default password, a state unit, a hacktivist group and a bored teenager can all get in the same way.

Why this matters outside supermarkets

Refrigeration is one example of operational technology that was connected for convenience and then forgotten. The same pattern applies to heating and ventilation, building access, cameras, energy management, production lines and warehouse systems. Experts quoted by Euronews named logistics, healthcare, manufacturing and data centres as the next places to look.

There is also an ownership problem. These systems are often bought and run by facilities teams and outside contractors, so they never appear in the IT asset inventory, the vulnerability scan or the NIS2 risk assessment. An attacker does not respect that division.

Checklist: what to do now

  • 1. Find everything that is online. Inventory all internet-reachable devices, including equipment installed by contractors and devices on mobile or 4G connections. Scan your own public IP ranges from outside.
  • 2. Take management interfaces off the public internet. Remote access goes through a VPN or a protected network. Filtering by contractor IP address at the firewall is a temporary measure at best.
  • 3. Change every default password. Use unique administrator credentials per site and multi-factor authentication where the device supports it. For Danfoss controllers, CERT-FR recommends the strict security level.
  • 4. Update, isolate or replace. Apply vendor firmware updates. End-of-life controllers cannot be secured by a reset: isolate them and plan the replacement.
  • 5. Monitor independently of the controller. The French blood banks lost nothing because a separate monitoring system noticed the temperature change. A sensor and an alarm path that the controller cannot switch off are cheap insurance.
  • 6. Watch for configuration changes. Alert on changed setpoints, defrost schedules and alarm thresholds, and send controller logs to your SIEM if the device can export them.
  • 7. Review contractor access. Who can log in remotely, from where, with which account, and is it logged? Put the security requirements into the maintenance contract.
  • 8. Preserve evidence before you reset. If a device was manipulated, save logs and configuration first, then restore, and check the configuration before reconnecting.

Frequently asked questions

Which countries were hit by the cyberattacks in Europe?
France in October, then on 2 and 3 November Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Germany and Romania. The UK reported attempts against small meat-processing firms.

How were the supermarket fridges hacked?
The refrigeration controllers were reachable from the internet for remote maintenance, many used default passwords, and many ran outdated or end-of-life software. The attackers logged in and used normal functions such as defrost mode to raise temperatures. No special malware was needed.

Who is responsible for the attacks?
That is disputed. France has blamed an Iran-linked unit for the October wave, Belgium's interior minister called Iran very likely responsible, Romania's cybersecurity director saw no state actor, and a claim by Russia-aligned hacktivists is unverified. The November wave has no official attribution.

Were the blood banks damaged?
No. At three sites of the French Blood Establishment the cold storage settings were manipulated, but monitoring detected the change quickly and no blood products were lost.

How can a company protect its own connected equipment?
Remove management interfaces from the public internet, change default passwords, update or replace end-of-life devices, monitor temperature and configuration independently of the controller, and include facilities equipment in the security inventory.

Bottom line

The attacks on Europe's cold chain succeeded because of three well-known weaknesses: devices on the public internet, passwords nobody changed and hardware past its end of life. None of them is specific to refrigeration. A company that can answer the question "which of our devices can be reached from the internet, and who looks after them?" is already ahead of most of the victims.

Want to know what your organisation exposes? A Pentest shows what an attacker sees from outside, SOC as a Service watches for configuration changes and logins around the clock, and in SecOps we bring facilities and contractor-run systems into the same security process as the rest of IT. Talk to us.

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